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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH by and through
its ROAD COMMISSION,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

I
. Case No.
10902

STYLE-CRETE, INC., a Utah
)
corpora tion,
Defendant and Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEf'
NATURE OF CASE
Separate eminent domain proceedings against two
different portions of the defendant's property were consolidated and tried before a jury.
DISPOSITION IN LU\VER COURT
At the jury trial the only issue was the amount of
compensation to be awarded defendant. On the jury's
answer to special interrogatories the trial court entered
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judgment against the Road Commission for $122,500.00, less a payment previously made, plus interest
and costs.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff and appellant seeks reversal of the judgment and remand of the case for a new trial.

STATEMENT OF FACT
Defendant owned a pre-cast concrete (or "precast stone") plant on a tract of 14.263 acres in Salt
Lake City, lying east of the Surplus Canal, north of
5th South street, and straddling what has become 23rd
""Test street (R. 180, Ex. l). As shown in Appendix
Figure l, the property was irregular in shape, with a
narrow neck fronting on 5th South, and a somewhat
wider corridor continuing north to a relatively large,
square area. There was no access to the property other
than from 5th South.
On December 27, 1965, the Road Commission
brought an action to condemn .417 acre of defendant's
property for relocation of a railroad right of way,
necessitated by highway construction in another area.
This action involved a strip of land 100 feet wide, running east and west across the south end of the panhandle of defendant's tract. The strip is identified as
"railroad" on the Appendix Figure 2.
2

On March 1, 1966, the Road Commission brought
a second action to acquire approximately 1.2 acres for
construction of a portion of a new thoroughfare to be
known as 23rd \:Vest street. The property to be taken
was a strip 80 feet in width running northerly and
southerly, bisecting the large north area of defendant's
property. In a preliminary non-jury trial the court
found defendant to be the owner of an additional strip
approximately 20 feet wide along the east side of the
panhandle, which increased the 23rd \:Vest taking to
1.582 acres (R. 182). These strips are identified on
the Appendix Figure 2 as "23rd West street". The
total property taken in both actions was 1.999 acres
(R. 180, 182).
Taking of the two strips, and construction of the
railroad bed and 23rd West Street, divided defendant's remaining property into three parts identified
on Figure 2 as Parcels "A," "B," and "C". Parcel
"A" contains .53 acres (R. 182) and now has frontage
on both 5th South and 23rd \:Vest streets. Parcel "B'',
upon which was located the building used by defendant
for the manufacture of pre-cast concrete, contains 3.472
acres (R. 183). Parcel "C," upon which defendant has
constructed a new plant, lies east of 23rd \:Vest and
contains 8.262 acres ( R. 183) .
Prior to relocation the railroad right of way had
been 800 or 900 feet to the north of defendant's building
(R. 190). The northern edge of the relocated right
of way is 9 to 10 feet, and the center line of the track
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about 40 feet, from the southwest corner of defendant's
building. The railroad track is 8 or 9 feet high (R.
194). The right of way is to be fenced (R. 201).
The new 23rd West street, from a point level with
5th South street, rises in elevation to cross the railroad,
then descends to a height of about two feet near the
northern part of defendant's tract ( R. 205-206). Defendant's access road having been taken, access to
Parcels "B" and "C" could be had only from 23rd'¥ est,
not a limited access highway (R. 209).
There is no existing dispute as to the location and
description of the property taken, or the character
of the improvements constructed on the property. There
is no substantial difference of opinion respecting the
value of the parcels actually taken. But there is serious
disagreement as to the amount of damages to the property not condemned resulting from ( 1) its severance,
and ( 2) construction of the improvements.
Defendant claims that its property has been so
damaged by the severance and construction that it is
now worth less than 1/3 of its former value. Testimony
was presented to the effect that defendant's solidly
constructed 17,000 square foot concrete building will
no longer be useable for the manufacture of pre-cast
concrete or anything else-indeed, will be suitable only
for "dead storage" (R. 671). The primary factors requiring an almost total abandonment of the building
were claimed by defendant to be ( 1) vibrations from
railroad trains, and ( 2) the reduction in area as a result
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of severance of Parcels "A" and "C" from the plant
site, Parcel "B," depriving the plant of needed storage
space for curing concrete products ( R. 280) .
There were confiicts in the evidence relating to the
effect of railroad vibrations upon the concrete manufacturing operation.

I

I

The trainmaster for Western Pacific Railroad
Company testified that 12 trains per day, averaging
80 to 100 cars and weighing approximately 5,000 tons
per train, could be expected to pass the defendant's
plant in a given 24 hour period ( R. 225-226) ; the speed
would vary, but the trains would be either accelerating
or decelerating in that area ( R. 229, 232). The train
schedule showed, however, that most trains would pass
the defendant's plant during periods in which it was
not in operation (Ex. D-12).
David J. Leeds, an engineering seismologist, who
had measured vertical vibrations emanating from other
railroad tracks in the vicinity (R. 283), found that the
vibrations measured 1/10,000 of an inch, and were
repeated seven times per second during the period in
which a train was passing (R. 307). In his opinion
the vibrail,ion was unacceptable, in part because it
"would upset the people" in the plant ( R. 323) , though
admittedly the amount of upset would depend on how
long-continued the vibration was and the type of operation being carried on in the plant (R. 323). Mr. Leeds
expressed the opinion that setting concrete would be
damaged by the vibrations (R. 319), "that incipient
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hidden damage might be sustained" (R. 319). Mr.
Leeds' knowledge of the properties of setting concrete
was based in part upon information obtained from the
Portland Cement Association (R. 329), but he had not
read any P.C.A. publications relating to the effects
of jarring on fresh concrete (R. 329).
Mr. McCown Edward Hunt, a consulting civil
engineer and partner in an architectural engineering
firm, stated that setting concrete would probably be
affected by vibrations (R. 444), but Mr. Hunt was
talking of vibrations of approximately I/16th inch,
not 1/10,000 as measured by Mr. Leeds (R. 447).
Mr. ';y esley Riddle Budd, an architect, testified
that concrete in the setting stage would be damaged
by vibrations, and on the assumption that railroad vibrations would damage the concrete products, his recommendation would be that the plant not be used for the
manufacture of pre-cast concrete. His opinions on the
effect of vibrations were based in part on information
obtained from the Portland Cement Association (R.
493).

Evidence respecting the critical character of setting concrete and the likely effect of railroad vibrations
was rebutted by witnesses called by the Road Commission. Mr. Oswald C. 'iVilde, engineer and estimator
for Otto Buehner Company, testified that the Buehner
plant located on 'iVilmington A venue in Salt Lake
City was within 25 to 30 feet of railroad tracks, close
enough for vibrations to be felt when trains passed.
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Nevertheless, no precautions were taken at that plant
to protect pre-cast concrete from vibration while setting, and he knew of no deleterious effects upon the
products manufactured at the plant (R. 850).
Mr. Wilde described operations in a new Buehner
plant in Murray, Utah, including the use of a "Shok
Beton," installed in place of traditional vibrators. A
Shok Beton is a large steel table, weighing from 15 to
30 tons (including its load), which is raised Vi inch
above a solid concrete floor and dropped two hundred
fifty times a minute ( R. 852). The resulting vibrations
can be felt without an instrument as far as 150 feet
away (R. 854), but setting concrete is placed as close
as 12 feet from the Shok Beton while in operation. It
is the practice of the company to run the Shok Beton
from a few to 30 or 40 minutes at a time, but during
its operation no precautions are taken to prevent vibration-caused damage to other concrete previously left
to set or cure.
Mr. Chris Pickett, district structural engineer for
the Portland Cement Association, which performs technical services and studies in connection with uses and
characteristics of cement and concrete ( R. 859) , testified that vibrations of the amplitude measured by
Leeds, or other vibrations which might be expected
from passing trains, would have no significant effect
upon setting concrete (R. 865). A publication of the
Portland Cement Association (Ex. 15) shows that random vibrations haYe not been found to be injurious to
7

setting concrete and in most instances have increased
its strength.
Defendant's evidence as to damage resulting from
the reduction in size of Parcel "B" because of its severance from Parcels "A" and "C", was more convincing;
and, because of the court's rulings on evidence, largely
unchallenged.
Delbert A. Peterson, defendant's president, testified that shop space, ample storage space, and parking
space are needed for efficient operation of a pre-cast
concrete plant (R. 263); and that construction of the
railroad and 23rd West deprived defendant of space
needed to store concrete products during the curing
period (R. 265). He said that one of the major factors
of damage to the concrete plant operation was that
Parcel "C" ( 8.262 acres), separated from the plant by
23rd West, could not be used for such storage ( R. 280).
Mr. Hunt confirmed the need for large outside
storage areas in the manufacture of pre-cast stone,
pointing out that storage must be available for various
purposes ( R. 439) . The reduction in the size of the
storage area adversely affects the flexibility of the plant,
according to Mr. Hunt (R. 456). Mr. Budd agreed
that plant expansion would be prevented (R. 497).
Ray Williams, defendant's appraiser, who concluded
that defendant's Parcel "B" would be marketable only
for dead storage, based his opinion in part upon the
severance. He testified at great length as to the impor-
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tance of a large area in the vicinity of the plant, not
only for the manufacture of pre-cast concrete, but for
necessary growth of any other potential industry (R.
687-688). C. Francis Solomon, an appraiser called
by plaintiff, in concluding that the highest and best
use of plaintiff's plant was no longer for manufacture
of pre-cast concrete, had been impressed by the lack of
storage area, and its effects as related to him by dedefendant's officers (R. 762-765, 831).
Notwithstanding the importance of size as an
element of damage to the defendant's property, plaintiff
was precluded from presenting evidence that comparable
property was available as a substitute for the severed
parcels.
After Mr. Peterson had told the jury of the need
for a large storage area, he was asked on cross examination whether he had inquired into availability of
property to replace that no longer available for storage.
Objection was made, but the court adjourned. before
ruling. On recall Mr. Peterson testified that he had
made an investigation of the availability of property
before condemnation and knew that property was
owned nearby by Mr. Arnold (R. 346).
Mr. Hunt, who had testified as to the need of large
outside storage areas (R. 439), was asked on cross examination concerning the possibility of substituting
land on the west, but an objection was sustained on the
ground that there had been no showing of availability
of other property (R. 457), notwithstanding Mr. Peter9

son's earlier testimony that he knew of the Arnold
property.
When plaintiff called Mr. R. L. Arnold, president
of Arnold .Machinery Company (R. 736), objection
was made to the testimony, before any questions had
been asked. The court indicated that evidence respecting the availability of other property was not material,
whereupon plaintiff made an offer of proof substantially as follows:
That Arnold Machinery Company, of which
he is the president, owns a parcel of approximately 10 acres of real property lying between
defendant's Parcel "B" and the right of way of
the Surplus Canal; that there are no distinguishing land marks separating the defendant's property from the Arnold l\iachinery Company
property; that the property, except for a small
portion lying north of Style-Crete property
along thet old 'Vestern Pacific right of way,
has been owned by Arnold Machinery Company
for approximately 25 years; that as of December
28, 1965, [the date of condemnation) the property was available for purchase by a purchaser
who was ready, willing and able to pay a reasonable purchase price therefor; that it was ultimately sold by Arnold lVIachinery Company in
May, 1966, for $3,000.00 per acre; and that the
question of purchasing the property had been
raised with officers of the defendant prior to its
sale (R. 934).
[Figure 3, Appendix, shows the location of the
Arnold Machinery Company property relative to defendant's property, the surplus canal, and other land·
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marks. Plaintiff's Exhibit 28, an ownership plat, shows
the location of the Arnold property, but the court
refused to admit it.}
Half of plaintiff's case having been annihiliated
by the court's rejection of evidence that comparable
property was available, the testimony of two appraisers
was anti-climactic and of questionable value on the
damages actually suffered by defendant.
Although somewhat different methods of computation were used, there was not much difference of
opinion as to the total value of the property before
condemnation. Mr. Williams' figure was $183,112.96
(R. 594) and Mr. Solomon's $184,700.00 (R. 726).
Mr. Williams believed the raw land itself would
be damaged by the taking and construction, largely
because of the need to fill to near street level. This
and his belief that the building could no longer be
used for anything other than dead storage led him
to conclude that the value of the land after the condemnation would be $32,532.00 and the building
$28,036.36, or a total of $60,568.36 ( R. 622), establishing $122,526.60 as the amount necessary to compensate defendant for taking and damage.
l\1r. Solomon was of the opinion that defendant's
building would be suitable for a number of types of
industry (R. 730) ; that the land would be worth $44,450.00 after condemnation; and that the improvements
would be worth $68,750.00-for a total "after" value
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of $II3,200.00 ( R. 7 41) . The amount needed to compensate defendant for taking and damage would thus
be $71,500.00.
[There was some evidence to the effect that the
defendant could no longer use a septic tank on its
property and would be forced to incur astronomical
costs for acquisition and maintenance of a "sealed
vault" for sewage disposal ( R. 514-517). The evidence,
however, was of doubtful weight; and the argument
to follow will point out why it, and evidence relating
to parking spaces and plant re-arrangement (R. 263272 ) are of minor significance with respect to the issues
raised in this appeal.}

ARGUMENT
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY EXCLUD·
ED EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE AVAILABILITY OF PROPERTY COMPARABLE
TO THAT SEVERED FROM DEFENDANT'S
PRE-CAST STONE PLANT.
Under the provisions of 78-34-10 Utah Code Annotated 1953, the jury in an eminent domain case is
required to determine the value of the property condemned, and
"If the property * * * constitutes only a part
of a larger parcel, the damages which will accrue
to the portion not sought to be condemned by
reason of its severance from the portion sought
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to be condemned and the construction of the
improvement in the manner proposed by the
plaintiff."
By its rulings on the evidence in this case the trial
court has disregarded the fact that "damages" not
"market value" are in issue, and has held, in substance,
that a condemnee has no obligation to mitigate those
damages. Moreover, the ruling appears to have been
made square in the teeth of cases decided by this court.
In the Provo River Water Users v. Carlson, 103
Utah 73, 133 P .2d 777 ( 1943), plaintiff had condemned
18.75 acres of defendant's pasture land for construction
of a reservoir. The property owner sought severance
damages on the theory that the taking of his pasture
land damaged other property being used as a dairy
farm. The trial court awarded severance damages but
was reversed on appeal. This court said:

" * * * this uncultivated pasture land was not
shown to be the only pasture land available within a mile and a half of the Carlson barns. * * *
"If other pasture lands approximately the
same distance from the Carlson barns could be
purchased, which would place Carlson in relatively the same position he was in before the
18.75 acre tract was condemned, he would be
damaged only to the extent of the cost of acquiring such other pasture. The purchase price of
such other pasture woulrl substantially determine the market value of the 18.75 acres."
The court then pointed out that even if uncultivated pasture land was not available, defendant would

13

not be entitled to severance damage if other farm lands
were available which would produce relatively the same
results, and continued:

"If [defendant} could purchase other pasture
land or farm land convertible into pasture, within a distance from his barns comparable to that
of the condemned tract, and such other land
would provide relatively the same kind of forage
for the same number of cows or forage of equal
ration-value throughout the seven months he
used the wild pasture tract, it could not be contended that his properties in Charleston could be
impaired or depreciated by taking the pasture.
If another tract of equal foreage-producing
value and conveniences could be substituted for
the tract condemned, whether larger or smaller
in area, the defendant would be in relatively ·
the same position he was in before the construction of the reservoir."

In State v. Cooperative Security Corporation of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 122

Utah 134, 247 P.2d 269, (1952), a highway condemnation case, plaintiff took 7.89 acres of pasture land,
part of a 131-acre dairy farm. The new highway bisected the farm, leaving two small tracts separated from
the main one. The trial court fixed $2,564.00 as the
value of the land taken, and $10,919.00 as severance
damage to the property not taken. On appeal, this
court noted the award must have been based on the
theory that the fair market value of the remammg
property, including the two small tracts, had been
depreciated by the $10,919.00, and said:
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"Even if it were conceded that the land taken
was part of the unit operation * * * and that
under the provisions of Sec. 104-61-11, (2),
U.C.A. 1943, respondents were entitled to severance damages for the portion not taken, the
question still remains whether under the facts
of this case severance damages to the extent
granted were proved.
The compensation to which an owner is entitled for severance damages in condemnation
proceedings is the difference in fair market value
of his property before and after the taking. State
v. 'i\T ard, 112 Utah 452, 189 P.2d 113. Where
severance damage is sought to a remaining tract
on the theory that the taking has depreciated the
fair market value of that tract there must be
proof that no comparable land is available in
the area of the condemned land.

* * * In the instant case there was evidence
that at the time the summons was served and
possession of the land sought to be condemned
was taken by the State there was available a
tract of pasture land adjacent to respondent's
property on the east and only separated from
it by a fence. This tract was comparable to the
land taken for the use to which it had been put.
It contained 15.3 acres and it was admitted
* * * that at least a part of it was available and
had been offered for sale but respondents had
refused to buy it." [Emphasis added. J
The court then went on to note that whether or
not the land was still available was not determinative,
inasmuch as damages accrue at the date of the service
of summons.
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The above cases should be controlling here unless
a pre-cast concrete plant in eminent domain proceedings
is sui generis, the principle having been applied to farm
and factory alike.
A decision relied upon in the Provo River Water
Users case, City of St. Louis v. St. Louis I.M. & S.R.
Co., 272 Mo. 80, 197 S.W. 107 (1917), involved a
manufacturing plant used for the production of white
lead. The plant consisted of two parcels divided by a
street, the south parcel being used as a "corroding
yard" upon which 48% of the lead production had been
corroded. The balance had been corroded on the north
parcel. The plaintiff condemned 17 ,800 of the 22,872
square feet on the south parcel, which rendered it useless as a corroding yard.
The condemnee contended that the taking from
the south corroding yard destroyed 48% of the corroding area, practically resulting in destruction of the
white lead plant. The condemnor on the other hand,
contended that the value of the plant was not depreciated because other parcels of land could have been procured by defendant to take the place of the south
corroding yard. The trial court found that immediately
west of and contiguous to the north parcel there was
for sale 21,000 square feet of land for about $51,000,
which was as available for use in connection with the
part remaining as the part appropriated; that defendant could continue to use the north parcel for lead
manufacturing to just as good advantage and as eco-
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nomically as before the appropriation by rearranging
it in connection with the 21,000 square feet; that it
would be as valuable as it was before the appropriation;
and, therefore, that the compensation allowed would
be the market value of the 17,800 square feet taken,
the depreciation in the market value of the 5,072 feet
south of the part taken, the cost of rearrangement, and
the depreciation in value of the 60,000 square feet in
the north parcel in its rearranged condition. On appeal
the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed, stating:
"It is conceded, of course, that damages for
land taken through the exercise of the power
of eminent domain may not be paid in anything
but money; that neither other parcels of land
nor the sale thereof are current media of payment therefor, and that the owner of land may
not be compelled to swap lands nor to move into
another town, or city, or state where the land is
cheap and have such cheapness compared as a
criterion of value against the lands taken. But
when land is devoted to a special use and it is
urged that such use has been wholly or partially
destroyed by the taking of a parcel of such land,
it will be appreciated that some complete criterion by which to measure the quantum of
damage sustained is absolutely necessary; otherwise the amount of depreciation would be a
mere matter of bald guessing.

" * * * The rule [adopted by the trial court J,
of course, should be limited to cases wherein
only part of a tract devoted to a special use is
appropriated. It can have no relevancy to a case
wherein the whole of a parcel is taken. For, we
repeat, in no case can the owner, for the con17

venience of the condemnor, be required to swap
lands, or go into the market and buy other lands
in lieu of those taken. But in a case where the
taking of a part of a tract which is devoted to
a special use results in a large depreciation in
value for that special use, the measure of that
depreciation ought to be the sum required to
be extended in order to rehabilitate the property
for such use, or replace the plant in statu quo
ante capiendum; provided, of course, that rehabilitation in such matter be practicable. * * *
In cases where no available property is owned
by him whose land is taken, the price at which
other lands adjacent, equally as valuable intrinsically, as convenient, as economical in use, and
as accessible, and which can be bought, may be
shown as measuring the amount of depreciation
to which the lands damaged but not physically
taken have been subjected.
"A situation wherein any other view is unthinkable is possible. For if the appellant's lead
factory had been worth a million dollars and the
parcel actually taken had been itself of little
value and it contained an accessory of small
intrinsic worth, but one without which the million dollar plant would have been rendered
useless, the principle would be exactly the same.
But even if appellant in the supposed case itself
possessed no other land, would it be contended
that the city could be saddled with the entire
value of the plant as damages, when other lands
in every way as available could be bought to
reduce the damages? We think not, and conclude that, insofar as the learned trial court
considered the price at which other lands, equally as available and useable by appellant could
have been obtained, as the measure of damages
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of the depreciation in rnlue of the whole plant
by reason of the taking of the corroding yard,
he was right * * * " [Emphasis added.}

In ~Hannibal Bridye Co. v. Slwuuacher, 57 lVIo. 582
brewery occupied two lots
separated by a street. A lot containing a portion of the
bre,rery equipment, connected to the other part by
pipes, was condemned. \Vithout the equipment the
brewery could not be operated successfully. The defendant contended that the taking of the one lot
destroyed the brewery and that it was damaged to the
brewery's full value. Although land was available on
the other side of the street on which the equipment
could be located so that the brewery could be successfully operated, the trial court refused to hear any
testimony on the cost of removing the equipment to the
other side of the street. The Missouri court reversed,
holding:
( 1847), the defendant's

"If [the equipment} could have been transferred to the western side of the alley and placed
in such a situation that the brewery could have
been just as effectively operated as it was before,
then the actual loss to defendants would have
been the trouble and expense of making the removal.
"This, then we are inclined to think would
be the proper and appropriate measure of damages, yiz;., the cost and expense of removing
the malt house, horsepower, pump and pipe to
the west side of the alley so it could be used as
effectively and adrnntageously for running the
brewery as it was run before. * '1:· * "
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In Illinois & St. L. R. Co. v. Switzer, 117 Ill. 399,
7 N .E. 664 ( 1886), the railroad condemned a right of
way across land upon which defendant operated a mill.
The railroad would have severed the main portion
of defendant's mill from lands containing its water
supply. When the railroad offered to prove that there
was other water which would be available to defendant
and serve its purposes just as well, the trial court refused the offer, but the Illinois Supreme Court reversed,
stating:
"There was, in this, manifest error, for which
the judgment must be reversed. There having
been an estimate of damages made on the bases
that the pond would be destroyed as a source
of supply of water for the mill and that there
would be no other means of such supply, it
obviously should have been permitted to show
that there would be other sources of supply not,
as is supposed by appellee's counsel, for the purpose of showing that there would be no damage,
but for the purpose of affecting the amount of
damage; the amount of the estimate of damages
by appellee's witnesses having based on the supposition that there would be no other means of
supplying the mill with water."
In City of St. Louis v. Paramount Shoe Mfg. Co.,

168 S.W. 2nd 149 (Mo. Ct. of Appeals, 1943), the

plaintiff had condemned a portion of defendant's land
upon which it proposed to expand its shoe manufacturing plant sometime in the future, plans for the expansion having been in existence. The defendant maintained that the city, by cutting off a small portion of
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the land upon which expansion was contemplated, had
substantially damaged the balance of the plant. As
noted by the court:
"Such consequential damage allegedly resulting from the limitation put upon the plant's
future expansion was the chief factor taken into
consideration by respondent's witnesses in connection with damages occasioned by the taking."
The value of the land actually taken was only a
small portion of the damages claimed. The city had
contended that evidence regarding the cost of available
land in the area should not have been admitted. The
appellate court rejected this contention, stating:
"It was competent for respondent to show,
not only the cost of any adjacent land upon
which a future additional building might be
erected but also the infeasibility of operating its
plant under the conditions which the erection of
the new building at that location would impose.
All this was relevant to the issue in the case for
if additional land could be acquired upon which
respondent's enlarged plant could be completed
and operated as satisfactorily as would have been
the case upon the land originally bought for that
purpose, then obviously there would have been
no injury done to respondent's property through
hinderance to expansion and its total damages
could hardly have exceeded the value of the land
actually taken by the appropriation.
"It has been said that in the case where
land is taken by condemnation, the price at which
he may buy equally valuable, convenient and
accessible land may be shown by the owner as
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measuring the amount of <lepreciation to whic.:h
the lau<l damaged but not physically taken has
been subjected * * '-* in this case it was un<loubtedly respondent's duty, when injured by the
appropriation of part of its land, to minimize
the damages to the remairnler if it could."
In Gulf C. & S.Jl'. Ry. Co. v. Brnyger, 24 Tex. Civ.
367, 59 S.,V. 556 (1900), the railroad had condemned
a portion of defendant's timber lands. The defendant
maintained that without these timber lands the value
of the remainder of his farm was seriously depreciated.
The plaintiff argued that there were other timber lands
in the area which were available to the defendant. The
court stated:

"It is clear to us that the proximity and the
price of adjacent or contiguous timber land of
a similar character was a fact proper to be considered by the jury in determining the extent
to which appellee's lands would be depreciated
by the loss of this particular tract."
The court pointed out that this was not for the
purpose of showing separate items of damages but a
matter to be considered in determining to what extent
the value of his land would be affected by the condemnation. The court held the testimony not to be
proper in that case, however, because it was not shown
when the lands were available. See also Union Electric
Light & Power Co. v. Snider Estate Co., 65 F.2d 297
(8th Cir., 1933).
Section 78-34-10, U.C.A., 1953, and the cases
construing it, e.g., State v. IV ard, 112 Utah 452, 189
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P.2d 113 (1948); State v. Fourth Judicial Court, 94
Utah 384, 78 P.2d 502, (1937), make it plain that there
is a substantial distinction between compensation for
land taken, and damages to property not taken. For
property taken, the measure of just compensation is the
market value of land taken; but for property not taken,
an owner is entitled only to an amount representing
the damage actually done to the land. It is an elementary principle of the law of damages that any per~on
damaged is required, where possible, to minimize or
mitigate his loss. If property were damaged by someone
lacking the power of eminent domain, the mitigation
rule would apply. It is difficult to conceive a rational
basis for relieving a land owner of the duty to mitigate
solely because his property is damaged by a legitimized
public use.
In the present case attempts to examine defendant's witnesses about the availability of land adjacent
to that being condemned and the feasibility of utilizing
that tract were thwarted by the court's rulings on the
defendant's objections. The Road Commission's offer
to prove the availability of comparable property was
refused. And the court failed to give any instruction
on the availability of other property.
The offer to proof, made after the objection to
testimony of R. L. Arnold, shows that there was land
adjacent to respondent's plant which would have from
all appearances, served to replace Parcel "C". The land
was available for sale on the date the summons was
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served and was ultimately sold for $3,000.00 an acresubstantially less than <lefendauf s land was claimed to
be worth.
The value of the land actually taken in this case
was very small (approximately $10,000) compared to
the total amount a warded by the j nry ($122 ,500) .
Although not presented by the defendant in that way,
simple mathematics shows that of the total award,
$112,500 was for severance damage to defendant's remaining land.
The court's rejection of evidence of the availability
of comparable property was error, and it can hardly
be gainsaid that the error was prejudicial, in light of
the theory on which the case was tried.
The exceedingly high severance and proximity
damages claimed by the defendant in this case were
based upon the following factors:
( 1) Vibrations emanating from the relocated track
of the Western Pacific Railroad would be expected
to damage setting concrete, thus prohibiting further
use of defendant's plant for pre-cast concrete products.

(2) The manufacture of pre-cast concrete required
a relatively large outside area in which to store the
concrete products while they cure. Prior to condemnation such an area was available in Parcel "C," but after
condemnation, because of the grade of 23rd 'Vest, it
was not, and defendant's plant therefore could no longer
be used for the manufacture of pre-cast concrete.
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( 3) All industrial plants need an area for con-

templated future expansion. By severing Parcel "C"
from Parcel "B'', the area surrounding the defendant's
pre-cast concrete plant was too small, and a reasonably
prudent man would not purchase Parcel "B" for any
manufacturing operation. It must therefore be used
for dead storage, a most uneconomical use.
( 4) By severing Parcel "A" from Parcel "B" and
taking the 20-foot way along the east side of Parcel
"B", the parking area was eliminated and the unloading
areas were reduced to such a size that operations of
the plant for the manufacture of pre-cast concrete
would be adversely affected.
( 5) The railroad with its nine-foot fill would inter-

fere with the esthetic enjoyment of those working in
or visiting the plant.
( 6) The pressure of the railroad embankment has
so changed the character of the underlying ground that
the water table has been raised, it will no longer be
possible to have a septic tank on the premises, and the
defendant will be required to use an inordinately expensive sealed vault for sewage disposal. A septic tank
cannot be installed with drain fields running in a different direction largely b ecause of the reduced size of
Parcel "B". A reasonably prudent person, therefore,
would not purchase the property for manufacturing,
and the person is useful only for dead storage.

The height of and vibration emanating from the
railroad are the only factors unrelated to the size of
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Parcel "B". A witness with long experience in the
manufacture of pre-cast concrete testified to the effect
that random vibrations have never been a problem; a
Portland Cement Association expert testified that vibrations of an amplitude much greater than those found
by Mr. Leeds would not affect adversely setting concrete; and a publication of the Portland Cement Association indicates that random vibrations not only do
not damage setting concrete but in many instances
strengthen it. For industry, esthetics is minor.
The evidence relating to the ability of the defendant to locate a septic tank upon its premises was speculative. Mr. Caldwell, of the Salt Lake City health
department, testified that the necessary steps to obtain
approval of location of a septic tank, including the
furnishing of information about test holes and the
character of the underlying ground, had never been
submitted to the City by the defendant.
The defendant did not offer any substantial evidence that the interference with the parking areas and
the unloading areas would prevent the continued operation of defendant's plant for the manufacture of precast concrete.
There was evidence that the size of Parcel "B" and
the need for curing, as well as the need for room to
expand in the case of other industrial operations, was
critical, and the jury must have been left with the
impression that even if the plant coul<l continue operations despite railroad vibrations, septic tank problems
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and reduced parking and unloading areas, the reduction
in size of Parcel "B" was so serious that the plant could
no longer be used for any purpose other than a "dead
storage" warehouse.
The court would not permit plaintiff to show that
the plant could have been "salvaged" and the damages
greatly reduced if the defendant had only desired to
do so, and if the jury believed defendant's evidence
respecting the size of Parcel "B", it had little choice
but to do what it did, even if it rejected all other factors. On its face the error was prejudicial and a new
trial should be granted.

II

THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING THE
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION
NO. 15, AND IN FAILING TO GIVE ANY INSTRUCTION RELATING TO THE EFFECT
OF AVAILABILITY OF COMPARABLE
PROPERTIES ON SEVERANCE DAMAGES
RECOVERABLE BY THE DEFENDANT.
The Provo River Water Users and Co-Operative
Security Corportaion cases, cited supra under Point I,
went further than merely holding that evidence of
the availability of comparable property is relevant and
material on the issue of severance damages. Both of
the cases are authority for the proposition that the
condemnee has the burden of proving unavailability
of replacement land.
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In the Co-Operative Security Corporation case
the court said :
"Where severance damage is sought to a remaining tract on the theory that the taking has
depreciated the fair market value of that tract
there must be proof that no comparable land is
available in the area of the condemned land."
(Emphasis added.)
Although the court had effectively precluded the
plaintiff in this case from showing that other land was
available, plaintiff asked the court for an opportunity
to ie-c tne Jlil'Y consider the question of the lack of proof
of unavailability of comparable property, much of the
opinion evidence in the case having been based upon
the assumption that the diminshed size prohibited any
economical use of Parcel "B". Plaintiff's requested
Instruction No. 15 (R. 80) was directed at this point.
The requested instruction was as follows:
"Damages sought by defendant in this case
include 'severance damages,' that is, damages
resulting to the defendant's remaining property
because of the separation of portions of the property of the property by 23rd 'Vest street on the
one hand and the railroad right of way on the
other.
"In order for the defendant to recover such
severance damages it has the burden of proving,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that as of
December 28, 1965, the date of service of the
summons, no comparable land was available to
it in the area which could be substituted for the
land taken or severed. If such comparable land
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was available to the defendant, proximity and
severance damages should total an amount representing the difference between ( 1) the value
of the remainder before the taking and ( 2) the
value of the remainder plus the comparable land
after the taking less the cost of the comparable
land."
The requested instruction substantially incorporates
the reasoning of the court in the Provo River Water
Users and Co-operative Security Corporation cases.
By refusing to permit the plaintiff to introduce evidence
respecting availability of additional property, and
refusing to give the requested Instruction 15, or any
instruction relating to the effect of comparable land
upon severance damages, the court placed the jury in
a position in which it had little choice but to accept
the opinion of one appraiser or another, whereas the
jury should have been free to consider the validity of
the assumptions made by both appraisers in arriving
at their opinions of "after" value.
Possibly requested Instruction 15 is not a model
instruction, but even so, the court had some duty to
place before the jury the "availability" question. It is
a matter that bears not only upon the direct claims of
the parties but the credibility of the various witnesses
who saw nothing but chaos in defendant's future.

Some instruction on this should have been given;

and if, for some reason, this court finds the requested
instruction was properly refused, it should exercise the
discretion provided for in Rule 51, U.R.C.P., and
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review the failure to give any instruction on availability
of comparable property.
III
THE COURT MISDIRECTED THE JURY
ON THE LA
AND COMMENTED ON THE
EVIDENCE.

''V

Not only did the court confine plaintiff to trial of
half a case, but with respect to that half it misdirected
the jury and commented on the evidence in such a
manner that the jury must have understood that it
would be pleasing the court if it gave full credence to
defendant's evidence and returned a verdict for as much
as the defendant was asking. A number of the instructions given by the court (at defendant's request) were
erroneous, and the cumulative effect was to deprive
the plaintiff of a fair trial by an objective jury uninfluenced by the court's expression of its views.
Instruction No. 4 (R. 19) which invokes Article 1,
Section 22 of the Utah Constitution, and the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, might
be proper in a civics class, but it directs the jury's
attention away from the issues being tried, i.e., the
amount of compensation and damages to be awarded
for the taking of defendant's property and construction
of the improvement, pursuant to Title 78, Chapter 3.Ji,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and decisions thereunder.
It is incorrect to state that a person whose property
is condemned for public use is to be made "no worse

30

economically," than if his property had not been condemned. Frequently great economic losses result to
condemnees because of the need to abandon or relocate
an established business; yet the compensation awarded
must come from within specific statutory and courl
rules. See, e.g., State v. Ward, 112 Utah 452, 189 P.2d
113 ( 1948); State v. Rozelle, 101 Utah 464, 120 P.2d
276 (1941); Springville Banking Co. v. Burton, 10
Utah 2d 100, 349 P.2d 157 (1960); State v. Bettilyons,
Inc., 17 Utah 2d 135, 405 P.2d 420 (1965). Instruction
No. 4, in effect, suggests to the jury that it may consider factors, not wholly expressed in dollars, which
might injure defendant in its future operations or
interfere with its plans for expansion and increased
profits. Moreover, the instruction erroneously states
the damages for severance as the "loss of value" in the
defendant's remaining property. This is particularly
so in light of the court's refusal to give plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 15 and its refusal to hear any
evidence respecting the availability of property which
would have permitted the defendant to mitigate its
damages. The jury was left only with an expert's
opinion as to the dimunition in the value of the property
without the opportunity to consider other factors which
might permit continued use of the concrete plant.
Instruction No. 8 (R. 23) unduly emphasizes the
defendant's evidence with respect to the damages it
suffered. The instruction is simply a catalogue of each
item of evidence relied upon by the defendant's appraiser and would be expected to impress the jury as
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a comment by the court that this evidence was of greater
importance than other evidence in the case relating to
damage. As stated in 88 C.J .S. Trial, §340:
"Since instructions should not draw the attention of the jury to particular facts, it is error to
give instructions and under other circumstances
it is proper to ref use to give instructions which
unduly emphasize issues, theories, defenses, particular evidence, specific or assumed facts, or
burden of proof, whether by singling them out
and making them unduly prominent * * *"
citing, among other cases, Mecham v. Allen, 1 Utah 2d
79, 262 p .2d 285 ( 1953).
We have been unable to find any support in the
cases for the proposition embraced by Instruction No.
10 ( R. 25), i.e., that notwithstanding severance of the
property into three more-or-less separate parcels the
jury was to consider the value of the remaining property as if it were still one parcel. It was undisputed
in the evidence that the three parcels were separated
by construction of the railroad right of way and 23rd
West street. The testimony of both appraisers, ref erred
to the property as three separate parcels, and there was
no evidence in the record respecting the market value
of the property as a single piece. Not only did the
instruction ignore defendant's obligation to mitigate
its damages, but invited the jury to speculate whether
defendant's damage might exceed even the damages
fixed by appraisers, who testified as to the values of
each of three separate parcels of property, it being
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common knowledge that marketing three parcels as
one would be more difficult. In State v. Tedesco, 4
Utah 2d 248, 291 P.2d 1028 (1956), this court held
that property taken by condemnation must go to the
condemnor for its fair market value for the total price
and not for an amount based on an aggragate of values
of individual lots in a subdivis1on, which the condemnee
hoped to sell individually. This, however, was for land
taken, not that remaining, and is the reverse of the
situation dealt with in defendant's instruction. It was
noted in Tedesco that "a condemnee is not entitled to
realize a profit on his property," but a profit could very
well be realized under defendant's theory.
Instruction No. 11 (R. 26) details factors testified
to by the defendant's appraiser respecting the comparability of properties used in arriving at his market
value opinion. This instruction substantially repeats the
views of the defendant's appraiser, and amounts to an
adoption of those views by the court. The jurors are
supposed to determine the credibility and weight of
the evidence; but the court assumed to tell the jurors
what factors they should find to be most influential:
"The more elements of comparison and similarity that the sale has with the subject property,
the more weight it is entitled in your determination of fair market value."
This is not a proper instruction. It is patently a comment by the court upon the credibility of the defendant's
appraiser as compared with the appraiser called by
plaintiff. The instruction is not only subject to the
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same objections as Instruction No. 8, but as a whole,
violates the well- established rule that it is error for
the trial court to charge on the weight or sufficiency
of the evidence. 88 C.J.S., Trial §285; Reid's Branson
Instruction to Juries, Vol. 1, 1960 Repl. §27; Smith
v. Cummings, 39 Utah 356, 117 Pac. 38; ( 1911) Olsen
v. S. H. Kress & Co., 87 Utah 51, 48 P.2d 430 (1955).
Instruction No. 12 ( R. 27) is similarily objectionable, since it emphasizes the rental-capitalization theory
of the determination of value as against the other
theories testified to by the appraisers, i.e., market sales
analysis, and reproduction cost. Again, it suggests to
the jury that the evidence given by the defendant's
appraiser respecting capitalization rates and rentals
was entitled to more consideration in determination of
the "after" value than was the reproduction cost evidence given by the plaintiff's appraiser. In addition,
the instruction improperly assumes facts (that buyers
do investigate rental income of property in determining
market value) not admitted. That this is improper
is clearly stated in Reid's Branson Instructions to
Juries, supra §27:
"A trial judge must not incorporate into his
charge assumptions or positive statements as to
facts which are in dispute since this practice may
impress his interpretation of the evidence upon
the jury."
Instruction No. 19 (R. 34) must have left the jury
with the impression that the defendant was a knight
in shining armor, who needed protection against a
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grasping, unhuman Road Commission. Loaded words
dominate the instruction. A mild preface respecting
the State's right to take the property, is followed by
the lament that a citizen has "no choice but to surrender
and yield up its property," and that the citizen is to
be paid "justly and fairly" for the property "expropriated from it." This instruction unfairly compares
the positions of the citizen and the condemning authority, and like previously mentioned instructions
erroneously states the law respecting the measure of
damages to the property not condemned. Moreover,
the use of capital letters in "JUST COMPENSATION," added to the other factors, tends toward a
rather one-sided presentation to the jury. Instructions
which are inflammatory or tend to excite passion, prejudice or sympathy are improper and "the giving of
such an instruction will ordinarily result in a reversal".
Reid's Branson Instructions to Juries, supra §110;
88 C.J.S. Trial, §343.
Instruction No. 20 ( R. 35) would reasonably be
interpreted by the jury as a comment by the court that
the appraiser called by the defendant was most believable, partieularly in light of developments subsequent
to the court's ruling that the appraiser called by the
State, Mr. C. Francis Solomon, might remain in the
courtroom notwithstanding the defendant's motion for
exclusion of witnesses ( R. 168-172).
In his cross examination of Mr. Solomon, the
defendant's counsel emphasized the term "advocate"
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and explored at length the reasons for .Mr. Solomon's
continued presence in the courtroom following the
court's ruling, and the possibility of some interest in
the outcome (R. 747-752). In addition, during the
course of the trial, counsel repeatedly made remarks
in the presence of the jury concerning the fact that
.Mr. Solomon had not been excluded and was remaining
at the instance of the plaintiff (R. 173, 261, 283, 749).
Instruction No. 20 cannot be read without consideration of the court's ruling on the exclusionary
motion, .Mr. Solomon's continued presence, the cross
examination concerning "interest in the outcome of
the case," and counsel's questions about advocacy. The
effect of Instruction No. 20 in this context is to suggest
to the jury that .Mr. Solomon, whose interest in the
case was "demonstrated" by his remaining in the courtroom, was not nearly so entitled to belief as was Mr.
Williams, the appraiser called by the defendant, because
the latter did not remain in the courtroom and ostensibly had no interest in the outcome. The fact that the
instruction covered some of the same ground as Instruction No. 25 makes the effect of the suggestion even
stronger.
Instruction No. 21 ( R. 36) is not particularly
harmful as the case was tried, inasmuch as the plaintiff
was prohibited from introducing evidence of the availability of comparable property. However, when the
case is remanded the trial court should be advised that
the jury need not return a verdict between the ranges
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testified to by the experts. The jury is entitled to consider the factors taken into account by each of the
experts in arriving at his opinion as to the value of the
property, and if it finds that some of these factors do
not exist or have been overstated, it can adjust the
expert's opinion accordingly.

IV
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY EXCLUDED EVIDENCE OFFERED BY PLAINTIFF.
During the cross examination of C. Francis Solomon, the appraiser called by plaintiff, defendant's
counsel went into great detail on the methods followed
by Mr. Solomon in preparing his appraisal report.
During the examination he asked for and obtained a
copy of the appraisal report ( R. 808-809) , and then
proceeded to cross examine .Mr. Solomon in great detail
about the computations and contents found in the
report ( R. 809 et seq.) He suggested the report, made
prior to trial, did not include any reference to the
relocation of septic tanks (R. 827). He cross examined
Mr. Solomon further with respect to the report and
the method used in arriving at the conclusions contained in the report (R. 831-838).
On redirect examination Mr. Solomon identified
Exhibit P-33 as his appraisal report prepared on February 4, 1967 (R. 844). He said the report was prepared and submitted prior to the date of the trial, and
that it contained the various computations with respect
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to which the defendant's counsel had cross examined
him (R. 845). But on objection of defendant's counsel
the court refused to admit the appraisal report in evidence, contrary to an established rule of evidence that
when a witness is cross examined with respect to the
contents of a document the document itself may be
introduced in evidence as part of the redirect examination of the witness. Nichols on Eminent Domain,
Vol. 5, § 18-1(1), 98 C.J.S. 'Vitnesses, §427, Wooten
v. State, 348 SW 2d 281 (Tex. Civ. Apps., 1961); Derrick v. Blazers, 355 Mich. 176, 93 N.W.2d 909 (1959).
As suggested in a number of cases the rule is a corollary
of that followed in State v. Cooper, 114 Utah 531, 201
P .2d 764 ( 1949), that any evidence logically tending
to rebut inferences raised on cross examination is admissible.

v
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NE'V TRIAL.
On April 5, 1967, plaintiff moved for a new trial
and pointed out to the court the error in its refusal of
evidence relating to the availability of comparable
property, its refusal to give the plaintiff's requested
Instruction No. 15, and its giving of various other
instructions (R. 95-96). On April 27, 1967, the motion
for a new trial was denied ( R. 99) , and an appeal was
thereupon taken to this court.

38

Plaintiff regards it as unnecessary to quote authorities in support of this point, since it is apparent that
if the court ruled improperly on the evidence and
instruction with respect to comparable property, a
material issue was never tried, and the only appropriate
relief to be granted is reversal of the judgment and
remand of the case for a new trial.

CONCLUSION
A determination of the amount of damages suffered
by a land owner (because of severance and the construction of the improvement) requires evidence not
so much of the "after" market value of the property,
as of the damages suffered. The damages may or may
not be the same as the "before" less the "after" value.
If there were no duty to mitigate damages, there would
be little room for argument, but the cases recognize
such a duty to mitigate, and this duty should be translated into a duty to obtain comparable property, if
available, to replace that severed, or that damaged by
construction of the improvement by the condemnor.
The trial court's refusal of evidence of the availability of comparable property, and its refusal to instruct the jury on the effect of availability, prevented
the jury from giving consideration to a substantial
factor in the determination of compensation and damages, and completely ignored a rule of law clearly
established by this court. Moreover, the court's rulings
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on the evidence, its misdirection of the jury, and its
comments on the testimony, precluded fair, objective
consideration of the issues actually tried.
The judgment should be reversed and a new trial
ordered.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General of Utah
BRYCE E. ROE
Special Assistant Attorney General
510 American Oil Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
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